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 Chapter 10 
 Water Integrity: From Concept to Practice 
 Håkan  Tropp ,  Alejandro  Jiménez , and  Hélène  Le  Deunff 
 Abstract  The adherence of water stakeholders and institutions to integrity princi-
ples is critical to improve water governance and sustainable water development. 
Integrity is strongly manifested in water decision-making, and the level of integrity 
plays a critical role in deciding the outcomes of decision-making, that is, who gets 
what water, when and how. In many countries, fragmented institutions obstruct 
accountability in a sector with high investment and aid fl ows, making the water sec-
tor particularly vulnerable to corruption. Governance failures such as corruption can 
take place at multiple levels and traverse all water uses, incurring huge cost for 
societies, environment and human development. This chapter provides insights into 
the role of integrity to improve governance and suggests an apparent need to include 
integrity and anticorruption-related issues in the analysis of and policy responses to 
water crises. Accountability in water supply services is used as an example to out-
line challenges and opportunities for strengthening integrity. 
 Keywords  Integrity •  Accountability •  Governance •  Anti-Corruption •  Water 
•  Water Services 
10.1  Introduction: There Is an Elephant in the Room 
 Water crises are not primarily driven by water resource scarcity but by governance 
failures. Many factors can affect the overall effectiveness and effi ciency of the 
water sector, such as systemic institutional ineffi ciency, limited staff capacities, 
scarce fi nancial resources, inappropriately set planning priorities, inadequate and 
poorly maintained infrastructure and political instability. However, the roots, mag-
nitude and consequences of the lack of integrity in water governance are some of 
the very important but much less well-known and addressed aspects. Low integrity 
and high levels of corruption are strong indicators that something is wrong with the 
governance system. Although the lack of integrity is far from unique to the water 
sector, water management is vulnerable to corruption, and such practices have dire 
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consequences for sustainable, effi cient and equitable water use, access and alloca-
tion. It has contributed to severe limitations in water reform implementation where 
processes of decentralisation and privatisation sometimes rather have opened up for 
new groups to exploit the system, despite the fact that arguments of better transpar-
ency and accountability were used to institute such changes in the fi rst place. 
 The risks associated with low integrity, such as corruption within institutions at 
the forefront to reform water resource management and deal with the water crisis, 
have to date been little recognised or studied. There is an urgent need to provide 
support to these institutions, which, despite the genuine commitment and honesty of 
their efforts to prevent corruption, often suffer from being new and poorly capaci-
tated and working at new scales and under new policies and laws. Improved water 
integrity would go a long way to increase the institutional effi ciency and effective-
ness to make required water reform changes. Corruption is a challenge in many 
parts of the world. Importantly, many countries in so-called developing regions are 
doing much better than some European countries. For example, according to the 
Corruption Perception Index 2014, countries like Malaysia, Botswana, Namibia and 
Rwanda ranked higher than Bulgaria, Greece and Italy (Transparency International 
 2015 ). 
 Limited water-related integrity incurs huge costs for societies, in lives lost, stall-
ing growth and degraded water resources. Corruption fuels unfair distributions of 
costs and benefi ts among different user groups or completely excludes certain 
groups of a particular water use. It can also be a strong driver to falling groundwater 
tables and diminishing ecosystem services due to unaccounted-for-water withdraw-
als of lakes and rivers. It increases transaction costs and implies very high invest-
ment risks for both public and private investors. In sum, increased sustainability, 
equity and effi ciency of water resources and services allocation, access and use will 
in many places be very hard to come by, or attained at a much higher cost, without 
improving integrity. For example, it has been estimated that corruption in water and 
sanitation signifi cantly increases the costs of reaching international water supply 
and sanitation targets (Transparency International  2008 ). 
 It is important to gain a better understanding of the links between corruption and 
policy outcomes. Most of the time policies and laws are not lacking; the problem is 
that they are not implemented. Key issues are how water institutions can break out 
of this non-implementation mentality and what measures can be taken to incentivise 
better adherence to policies, rules and regulations. 
 It is long overdue to start to speak about the elephant in the room – the politically 
sensitive and unspoken drivers and consequences of corruption in the water sector – 
and above all to make systematic and coherent efforts to improve water integrity. 
This chapter points towards a need to strongly include integrity and anticorruption- 
related issues in the analysis of and policy responses to water crises. Not only is 
there a need for changed behaviour among public and private water decision- 
makers, service providers and users, but it is also high time for setting in place a 
strong research agenda to assess the impacts of corruption in water and to contextu-
alise policy responses and interventions to improve water integrity. Increased 
investments in integrity can reap high returns in improved revenues, effi ciency 
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gains, equitable water distribution, increased infrastructure investments and social 
and economic development. 
10.2  High Integrity Risks in the Water Sector 
 Governance failures such as corruption can take place in most facets of water man-
agement and traverse all water uses, such as irrigation, hydropower, infrastructure 
development, water supply and sanitation and water for environment. It can appear 
in many forms, from petty to grand-scale corruption – falsifi ed water metre read-
ings, skewed distribution of water use permits, illegal water connections and/or 
water outtakes (surface water and groundwater) for agriculture or households, pub-
lic sector procurement processes, infrastructure development, policy capture by 
elites and many more. It can involve two or more actors and can take place, for 
example, within the public sector when funds are leaking out of budgets, kickbacks 
between public and private sectors in procurements and between service providers 
and consumers when water fees are not paid to the water utility or when water is 
illegally tapped (Stålgren  2006 ). Corruption affects all sectors, from education, 
health and forestry to transportation and many more (see, e.g. Edgardo Campos and 
Pradhan  2007 ). A survey in South Asia pointed to law enforcement authorities 
(police and judiciary systems) as the most corrupt public institutions, followed by 
land administration (Transparency International  2002 ). Similarly, the construction 
sector is deemed high risk for bribery and corruption. It is apparent that corruption 
in other sectors impacts how water is used and allocated. For example, in most 
countries access to land and land rights is the pathway to also have access to water 
resources and the right to use it. Disputes over land and water are often settled by 
the court system. Construction of infrastructure is common in relation to water stor-
age, water distribution, urban and rural water services, hydropower, fl ood protection 
and wastewater treatment. As a result it is critical to consider water integrity in a 
broader context since it relates heavily to other sectors. 
 The water sector is vulnerable to corruption. For example, institutional 
 fragmentation makes decision-making authority for water extremely dispersed 
across political and administrative boundaries and agencies, which creates many 
loopholes to exploit. The provision of water services is monopolised and involves 
large fl ows of public funds in a noncompetitive way. Large water projects are 
capital- intensive and complex, which makes procurement lucrative, manipulation 
diffi cult to detect and corruption more likely to occur. When these factors appear in 
systems characterised by limited openness, transparency and accountability, patron-
age and discretionary decision-making, risks turn into practices of corruption and 
other forms of rent-seeking behaviour. 
 Many countries in Africa and Asia are stepping up their efforts signifi cantly to 
develop water-related infrastructure as a response to development needs and 
expected impacts of climate change. The Sustainable Development Solutions 
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Network (SDSN) estimates that USD 1–3 trillion is needed in infrastructure invest-
ments in developing countries in order to meet intergenerational development 
needs. It comes with high water integrity risks associated with procurement of ser-
vices, location and design that can threaten the very effectiveness of investments. 
The construction sector is ranked globally as one of the most vulnerable sectors to 
corruption (Transparency International  2005 ). The potential for large-scale corrup-
tion in infrastructure development can be so substantial that it skews policy-making 
towards the most “lucrative” investments and not those that are better for technical, 
social and economic reasons (Butterworth and de la Harpe  2009 ). Similar chal-
lenges have been identifi ed in climate proofi ng new or already existing water infra-
structure (Jacobson and Tropp  2010 ). 
10.3  The Consequences of Corruption 
 The impact of corruption in water can be severe and reaches far beyond water use 
and allocation and water supply services since it ultimately threatens or delays 
development and can make it more costly to achieve. Many times poor people are 
those worst affected since it hampers development of public services and skews 
natural resource allocation towards those with political clout and economic infl u-
ence. In cases where corruption is endemic, the system becomes almost self- 
perpetuating and puts people and organisations between a rock and a hard place. For 
a farmer, not paying a bribe for water access can be the difference between having 
food on the table and not. 
 The general research on corruption concludes that it lowers investments and 
hampers fair competition among businesses. It undermines the rule of law, spreads 
mistrust and undermines the legitimacy of government institutions. It cripples the 
public sector to provide acceptable services to the public, such as education, health 
and water supplies. It causes misallocation of public funds as well as natural 
resources to the detriment of social justice and economic growth. Corruption sys-
tematically undermines sustainable development since it weakens environmental 
protection and undermines efforts to reduce income inequality and poverty (see, e.g. 
Edgardo Campos and Pradhan  2007 ; Stålgren  2006 ). 
 The lack of integrity has dire consequences for water, its uses and allocations. 
The following examples are provided:
•  It undermines water reforms and their implementation. For example, it will be 
much harder to realise elements of integrated water resource management. In 
fact, if issues of transparency and accountability are not addressed, reforms such 
as decentralisation of decision-making can have perverse effects. 
•  It siphons off scarce monetary resources and diminishes a country’s prospects for 
providing water and sanitation for all or to improve water storage. It leads to 
ineffi cient and unequal allocation and distribution of water resources and related 
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services. It also contributes to increased water pollution and overabstraction of 
groundwater and surface water. 
 Various estimates of the costs of corruption are underestimations since they do 
not take into account secondary social and economic impacts or opportunity costs 
of corruption. For example, the costs in terms of health and loss of income-earning 
opportunities for poor people being locked out of certain water uses can be extremely 
high. It can result in loss of harvest or fewer educational opportunities for girls if 
they have to walk even longer distances to collect household water. While this can 
be observed at micro-level, it is diffi cult to aggregate the social and developmental 
impacts at macro-level. Costs of global corruption as calculated by, for example, the 
World Bank do not take into account opportunity costs of corruption to reduce pov-
erty and inequalities, such as through improved access to water services. Nor does 
it contain costs of health impacts, environmental degradation, poor construction, 
infl ated prices, etc. that can follow in the trail of corrupt behaviour. Kenny ( 2007 ) 
made use of indirect impacts to estimate the actual costs of kickbacks and cartels in 
some South Asian cities and found that it infl ated the price of a sustainable water 
connection by 25–45 %. 
 It is clear that lack of integrity in the form of corruption has many detrimental 
impacts on society and development. While there are many narratives on corruption 
and how it impacts micro-levels, there is a lack of more systematic macro-level 
data. Due to the nature of corruption, it is diffi cult to collect data on the micro- and 
macro-economic, social and opportunity costs of corruption. Favours are normally 
exchanged behind closed doors with the intent to leave as few traces as possible. 
Finding and interpreting data is often a matter of building trust and endless corrobo-
ration and triangulation of data. In many cases there can be high individual and 
professional risks to research corruption issues. 
10.4  Linking Governance and Integrity 
 Integrity has emerged as a new concept in the water sector, which is critical to 
address in order to improve water governance and achieve more sustainable water 
development. Integrity is often used as a euphemism for corruption. Water integrity 
is defi ned as the adherence of water stakeholders and institutions to governance 
principles of transparency, accountability and participation, based on core values of 
honesty, equity and professionalism. In a more practical sense, integrity can refer to 
how well governance regimes or systems adhere to the rule of law, predictability in 
decision-making procedures and outcomes, and whether decisions hold up to public 
scrutiny and to what extent they can withstand different types of vested interests and 
corrupt practices. Corruption in water is here used as a particular case to highlight 
issues of water integrity. Integrity aspects are very important for water use decision- 
making, and the level of integrity plays a critical role in the quality of governance 
that decides the outcomes of decision-making, that is, who gets what water, when 
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and how. Importantly, governance is a neutral concept, and in cases where corrup-
tion is widespread, it may actually be how that particular governance system 
functions. 
 Accountability in water supply services is here used as an example to outline 
some challenges and opportunities for strengthening integrity. Accountability must 
be part of the relationship among policy-makers, service providers and clients. As a 
result, increased emphasis has been placed on strengthening the ability of citizens, 
civil society organisations and other non-state actors to hold local governments 
accountable for their commitments to improve service delivery and make them 
more responsive to citizens’ needs. It is crucial to build capacity in local govern-
ments to not only deliver services effectively but to also enhance their ability to 
engage citizens by fostering dialogue and participation. 
10.5  Approaches to Water Integrity 
 The literature refl ects only slight growth in studies on water integrity-related issues, 
such as on analysing the dynamics of corruption, mismanagement and poor gover-
nance in the water sector. Many of the corruption risks are generically well known, 
but we know far less about how corruption plays out in certain contexts and what 
type of incentives through social pressures, policy and legal measures can be effec-
tively applied. 
 There are three main approaches to corruption and related anticorruption mea-
sures (see UNDP  2011 ).  The fi rst – and the most common view – is characterised as 
the “rotten-apple” perspective. Corruption is seen as the misbehaviour and moral 
misconduct of individual civil servants and less as something systematic or ingrained 
in the system. Well-functioning upward accountability systems and various checks 
and balances along with legal measures are considered going a long way towards 
minimising corruption.  The second view is related to rent-seeking behaviour of civil 
servants. Civil servants are considered opportunistic and self-serving which 
increases the risk of corruption. More controls and checks and balances are not 
primarily seen as solutions but rather changes such as privatising services or con-
tracting out more public services to the private sector. However, experience sug-
gests that there are big corruption risks in relation to processes of privatisation and 
contracting between public and private sectors. Consequently improved account-
ability and transparency are still important factors when the private sector is increas-
ingly engaged with, for example, water services provision.  The third approach 
considers corruption in light of complex and dynamic social, political and economic 
processes. Corruption is not only something that goes on between individuals but is 
embedded and institutionalised, and in some cases it is not an anomaly but how the 
system functions. Corruption is seen as power struggles between groups and a way 
of gaining control of and securing resources in society or policy capture. Some of 
the remedies suggested are, for example, improved social accountability that 
empowers civil society groups, such as water user or consumer groups to hold civil 
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servants and elected politicians to account. It also presupposes an improved fl ow of 
and better access to information in society and free media. 
 Here a particular view is not chosen since it can be context specifi c and many 
times it may be a mix of these three approaches. It is clear that improved account-
ability is important for all of them to work. To date, much of the work to improve 
water integrity has been to prevent it from happening in the fi rst place, that is, 
 proposed measures have focused on improving the system and strengthening insti-
tutional set-ups. 
 In his seminal work on corruption in irrigation in India, Wade ( 1982 ) described 
how irrigation engineers were able to illicit signifi cant revenues by controlling con-
tracts and the distribution of water to the farmers and that it was part of a larger 
system, redistributing parts of revenue to higher-ranking public offi cials and politi-
cians. Corruption was seen as a main reason for the poor performance of canal- 
irrigated agriculture. Similar studies have been undertaken in Pakistan (Rinaudo 
 2002 ) to show how corruption determines water allocation and that it entails not 
only the rich and infl uential farmers but also powerless small-scale farmers. Another 
study pointed to the role of patronage and clientelistic linkages in petty corruption 
in Kazakhstan and grand-scale political capture in Chile as determinants of how 
water resources are allocated within agriculture (Warner et al.  2009 ). Similar pat-
terns of patronage and clientelism linkages were found in urban water pollution and 
in the relations between NGOs and local authorities (Tropp  1998 ). Another study 
pointed to the high frequency of kickbacks to public offi cials and tampering with 
water fees in urban water supply in some major Indian cities, leading to big revenue 
losses (Davis  2004 ). 
 Principal-agent theory has been used to explore relational patterns between the 
“principal” (consumer or client) and the “agent” (the service provider) and the vari-
ous types of exchanges (money, favours, nepotism) that can take place. Problems 
with principal-agent relations are related to suboptimal contracts and agreements (if 
they exist in the fi rst place) between exchange partners, such as between local pub-
lic offi cials and farmers for release of water to irrigated farming or between the 
service provider of household water and the consumer. A major problem that can be 
exploited is that the providers of the service normally have better information and 
knowledge of the service provision value chain as compared to the consumers of the 
services. This is a case of asymmetric information, where the information advan-
tage by service providers can be misused for corruption and other rent-seeking 
behaviours, such as overpricing. In contexts where regulation enforcement is lax 
and where there is little transparency and openness to share information, the risks of 
corrupt behaviour will increase. The provision of water services is considered close 
to a natural monopoly; hence, there is very little scope for replacing the water ser-
vice provider with another one. This lack of competition will further increase risks 
of, for example, corruption and overpricing 1 (see, e.g. Huppert  2002 ). 
1  The informal water service sector contains many small-scale operators and can be competitive. 
However, there are many accounts where local providers divide up local markets, creating “water 
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 In the above cases, important features are patron-client-like relations and that 
information is tilted towards the advantage of government agencies. Many times 
public offi cials might be tempted to make power and information asymmetries work 
to their advantage to reap illicit incomes. Patronage and clientelism makes 
 decision- making discretionary and allows for personal motivations of public offi -
cials and politicians to seek out illicit income-earning opportunities. 
 The improvement of accountability would require that relevant information is 
accessible to the public and that stakeholders can take part in decision-making pro-
cesses. What makes the situation more complex is that civil society is often weakly 
organised. Politics can also slow, skew or stall these processes, as government 
departments and individuals try to prevent or impede actions that are seen to threaten 
their own power and authority. 
10.6  Horizontal and Vertical Governance Interface 
 While horizontal work on strengthening governance has been ongoing for many 
years in areas such as putting in place anticorruption commissions, special prosecu-
tors and ombudsman, the water sector itself has at large been turning a blind eye to 
integrity and anticorruption issues. It was not until 2005 that these issues started to 
receive international recognition and attention, and more systematic counterreac-
tions were being developed through initiatives such as the Water Integrity Network. 
 The experience of setting in place national anticorruption commissions, special 
anticorruption prosecutors and ombudsman has had very few benefi ts or even nega-
tive impacts (Heilbrunn  2004 ). The development of anticorruption commissions 
and other similar bodies has frequently been demanded by donors but not owned by 
policy-makers and implementing agencies. Moreover, in many cases the establish-
ment of such commissions has been used as an excuse to avoid and ignore needs for 
deeper reforms. A worst case scenario is that anticorruption institutions are misused 
in national power struggles to discredit political rivals. Anticorruption commissions 
have been plagued by lack of independence from the government, limited budgetary 
support and investigative powers and unclear procedures in forwarding cases to 
prosecution. 
 It is critical to continue to address corruption from a horizontal and holistic gov-
ernance angle, but ultimately any national corruption strategy needs to be imple-
mented within sectors. A targeted sector approach owned and driven by the sector 
can be more practical and realistic to actually make headway on anticorruption 
measures and improved governance. Successful sector work to improve integrity 
can thus have an important snowballing effect. 
 The long-term viability of a sector approach is thus supported by efforts that 
strengthen governance in the interfaces of horizontal and vertical governance. 
oligarchs”. There are also several accounts from many slum areas in cities where water services are 
controlled by local organised crime. 
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Improved water integrity also requires cross sector work and collaborations since 
water use cuts across many other sectors. 
10.7  Improving Accountability in Water Service Delivery 
 Integrity is about improving transparency, accountability and participation in the 
service delivery framework, which has signifi cant impacts on how services are 
delivered in practice. 
 In most countries, institutional arrangements for water service delivery are in 
place: policies, plans and institutions exist, yet performance remains poor. In this 
context, accountability, which is about improving the quality of relationships between 
the different stakeholders in service delivery arrangements, is a key element to make 
these institutional arrangements function as intended. Accountability is about coming 
to grips with institutional defi ciencies, through implementing the allocated mandates, 
roles and responsibilities as outlined in, for example, rules and regulations. Some 
evidence supports these statements. An evaluation report by the European Union of 23 
water supply and sanitation projects in sub-Saharan Africa found that although equip-
ment was generally installed as planned, fewer than half of the projects delivered 
results meeting the needs of benefi ciaries. It was suggested that a majority of these 
projects were potentially sustainable in the sense of using standard technologies and 
local materials, but governance aspects were the key weakness for continuous service 
(European Court of Auditors  2012 ). In another recent Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) research project focused on challenges to service delivery in the African con-
text, three main constraints for service delivery were identifi ed: incoherent policies, 
poor top-down disciplines and limited bottom-up accountability relationships, and 
limited scope for problem-solving and local collective action (Tavakoli et al.  2013 ). 
 Transparency and participation contribute to improved accountability. 
Transparency refers to openness of governance processes and free access to offi cial 
information. Increased access to information enables citizens to scrutinise the work 
of government, and more transparency can put pressure on government offi cials to 
be accountable, perform better and avoid corruption (González de Asís et al.  2009 ). 
Participation refers to the opportunity for citizens to provide informed, timely and 
meaningful input and infl uence decisions at various levels. It also refers to the 
mechanisms used by citizens to express themselves and to infl uence decisions and 
processes in the political, economic and social sphere. 
 Accountability have been identifi ed as a key enabling factor for improved gover-
nance of water, but the challenge remains to fi nd the best ways to strengthen 
accountability links in the water sector (Sohail and Cavill  2007 ). Acknowledging 
that institutional inertia is at the core of the problem, many external support agen-
cies (donors, international organisations, NGOs, etc.) have targeted their support to 
national accountability on strengthening relationships between actors. How can 
external support strengthen accountability links in a meaningful way without dis-
torting national accountability frameworks? This section discusses the potential 
roles and challenges of accountability support, based on experiences in the Water 
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Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector. The fi rst part attempts to defi ne account-
ability, before “unpacking” the key concepts into different objectives. The section 
ends with a discussion about the challenges encountered in the implementation of 
different accountability support interventions. 
10.7.1  Defi ning Accountability Among Service Delivery Actors 
 Accountability refers to sets of controls, counterweights and modes of supervision 
that make offi cials and institutions in the public and private sector answerable for 
their actions and ensures that sanctions are applied against poor performance, illegal 
acts and abuses of power. Well-functioning accountability mechanisms can help 
clarify the commitments of actors involved in water governance, lead to effi cient 
management of fi scal resources, protect water resources and increase control over 
the actions of public and private stakeholders and ensure minimum quality stan-
dards (UNDP and SIWI  2013 ). 
 A combination of mechanisms can be put in place to operationalise the account-
ability principle (see Fig.  10.1 ).  Horizontal accountability describes relationships 
where a state actor has the authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on 
another state actor. Horizontal oversight systems are thus based within the legal and 
justice system. They include mechanisms of internal oversight and checks and bal-
ances within an institution (internal control) or oversight and checks and balances 
of public institutions.  Vertical accountability links citizens directly to the govern-
ment. Vertical accountability exists when non-state actors such as the media, non- 
governmental organisations or individuals place pressure on state actors for 
improved services. Traditionally, elections and the use of informal processes are the 
direct way to channel citizens’ “voices” to exert pressure on policy-makers. Indirect 
forms of vertical channels include civic engagement, lobbying and mass mobilisa-
tion.  Transversal or  hybrid accountability refers to the participation of citizens and 
civil society (actors from the “vertical” accountability relationships) in horizontal 
(state-to-state) processes of accountability. This type of mechanism helps overcome 
the limited impact of traditional civil society methods, strengthens horizontal mech-
anisms of accountability and legitimises the inclusion of citizens in government 
oversight functions. The use of horizontal institutions by the public to improve 
accountability interactions between the state and water users can help develop civic 
engagement and foster the development of social accountability mechanisms. Social 
accountability describes mechanisms which involve civil society in holding duty 
bearers to account for the performance of service provision. Social accountability 
tools can be used both to hold public offi cials to account and to improve the account-
ability link between users and service providers. In addition, distinctions can be 
made between specifi c domains of accountability; in this sense, we talk about politi-
cal, administrative, legal and fi nancial accountability.
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10.7.2  Unpacking Accountability in Water Service Delivery 
 The analysis of accountability addresses a wide range of interactions between mul-
tiple service delivery actors occurring at different levels. The human rights frame-
work offers a useful way of understanding the accountability challenges by depicting 
the different dimensions of the accountability system into responsibility, answer-
ability and enforceability (OHCHR  2013 ). Adapting this framework to the water 
sector (UNDP WGF/UNICEF  2015 ), we defi ne three main levels of intervention:
 (A)  Defi ning the roles and enabling cooperation in service delivery . A precondition 
for accountability is that those in positions of authority (governments and ser-
vice providers) have clearly defi ned duties and performance standards, enabling 
their behaviour to be assessed in a transparent and objective way. At the same 
time, users need to know their rights and obligations. Moreover, effective coor-
dination mechanisms between different responsible parties need to be put in 
place. Promoting responsibility focuses on three different objectives: enhanc-
 Fig. 10.1  Vertical, horizontal and transversal dimensions of accountability (Source: Own elabora-
tion from UNIFEM  2008 ) 
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ing policy coherence, providing clarity in the defi nition of responsibilities and 
improving coordination in the sector. 
 (B)  Informing, consulting and including stakeholders in all stages of service deliv-
ery . The emphasis at this second level of intervention is that timely and accu-
rate information is made available about service provision, such as the current 
status of services, the performance of service providers or the decisions about 
fi nancial allocations. Spaces for interaction between users, services providers 
and government also need to be created to enable participants to explain, ques-
tion, discuss and/or justify decisions. The three main objectives of support to 
greater answerability in service provision will be to enhance the fl ow of infor-
mation and use of consumer feedback, to improve consumers’ access to infor-
mation and to create spaces for stakeholders’ participation. 
 (C)  Monitoring performance and supporting compliance and enforcement . The 
third level of intervention focuses on enforcing mechanisms, which aim to 
monitor and ensure compliance of public offi cials, service providers and insti-
tutions with established standards; to impose sanctions on offi cials and compa-
nies who do not comply; and to ensure that appropriate corrective and remedial 
actions are taken when required. Two main objectives can be identifi ed for 
improving enforceability, namely, to establish or support the regulatory func-
tion and to strengthen external and internal control mechanisms. 
10.7.3  Challenges and Success Factors 
 Accountability is not the responsibility of only one type of institution but involves 
all stakeholders of the water services, often in shifting roles (as duty bearers and 
rights holders), and it is infl uenced by a range of social and political factors. There 
are many possible entry points and approaches for promoting accountability in 
water service delivery, depending on the needs as well as the wider political and 
economic context in which accountability processes take place. However, research 
suggests that initiatives taken to support accountability relationships face a series of 
challenges suggesting that there is space for better fi tted approaches. Much effort 
has been dedicated in recent decades to support the defi nition of clear policy frame-
works and to enhance sector coordination in developing countries. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD  2005 /2008) has also boosted this effort. 
More than one decade later, a few lessons can be learnt. Too often, policies pro-
moted and adopted have been based on international blueprints and have not taken 
into consideration the reality of the country, drawing a picture that is too far removed 
from actual practice and possibilities of the country (OECD  2013 ), leading to poor 
implementation. External support agencies have also supported coordination mech-
anisms in many countries. However, trickle-down effects have been limited, and on 
many occasions, increased coordination at the national level has not improved ben-
efi ts in terms of service delivery to citizens at the other end. Hence, policy processes 
cannot translate into improved responsibility unless authorities provide guidance 
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and clarifi cation on the general principles contained in policy documents by devel-
oping the necessary decrees, acts or laws. Moreover, information about policy and 
action needs to be made readily available to all stakeholders; in practice, policies 
often take years to be known at local levels of government or by end users. Finally, 
implementation of policies requires that public resources are allocated and that key 
actors have the necessary capacities to deliver. Very often, these conditions are not 
met. With regard to coordination among accountability actors in the water sector, 
the case of Uganda (SIWI/WIN/WSP  2012 ) offers important lessons in how these 
efforts have to be clearly linked to improved access to information, clear and mea-
surable indicators and the establishment of feasible commitments for annual 
improvement. 
 Engaging stakeholders and increasing the fl ow of information and participation 
have been mainly supported through a social accountability approach, focusing on 
strengthening citizens’ demand for improved transparency and performance. In cer-
tain cases, good short-term results have been announced with enthusiasm. However, 
in the long run, social accountability mechanisms need to be institutionalised and 
aligned with formal accountability mechanisms – and not compete with or under-
mine them. A typical example of this phenomenon can be found in the monitoring 
mechanisms of services based on users’ collaboration in data collection. To sustain 
citizen mobilisation in the long run, interaction is vital as well as visible impacts. 
Findings in East Africa (SIWI  2013 ) point to the need to complement this type of 
tools empowering users with a parallel development of the capacity of water service 
providers and government to act upon the information collected. Support to account-
ability in the water sector involves interactions with political actors and politicised 
processes. In actions aiming to engage the population in order to improve answer-
ability, a context-sensitive approach can entail addressing issues of privacy and 
security. In the same way, in certain contexts it might be necessary to invest time 
working to increase the political receptivity to citizens’ demands and criticism to 
avoid serious risks for people and institutions. When the objective of the interven-
tion is to build or improve the relationships across accountability actors, the main 
challenge is to link the stakeholder dialogue exercise with offi cial decision-making 
processes. Development partners need to ensure that adequate resources are allo-
cated for the completion of these dialogues, since they are often time and resource 
intensive, especially if inclusiveness is one of the objectives. Managing the expecta-
tions of dialogue participants is also crucial. 
 Opening up the political willingness for the establishment of regulatory func-
tions in water services has proved to be a long and diffi cult process. Acceptance and 
understanding of the regulatory process by the consumers and other stakeholders 
and broad institutional support for the regulatory body is a fi rst condition; once the 
institution is established, fi nancial autonomy is required. The inclusion of citizens 
in the regulatory function (as, e.g. Water Watch Groups that inform the regulator 
directly through mobile phones) is a very interesting development of transversal 
accountability. Evidence from Zambia (SIWI  2008 ) shows that this type of coopera-
tion can help raise the profi le and public knowledge about the regulator and is a 
cost-effective source of information on sector performance for the regulator. 
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Oversight institutions can also be general and not sector specifi c. Anticorruption 
agencies and other oversight institutions will require the presence of a strong 
 judiciary, i.e. courts to back up their constitutional authority when prosecuting 
cases; moreover it is essential that “whistle-blowers” and ordinary citizens are pro-
tected from retribution. 
10.8  Some Lessons Learnt 
 Accountability is a powerful entry point to improve water integrity and thus water 
governance. However, external support agencies face multiple challenges in their 
support to accountability. Experience shows that approaches fi nanced by external 
actors can run the risk of remaining externally owned at least in the short to medium 
term. A critical condition for effective aid-funded activities is to analyse the incen-
tive structures for accountability in order to identify and manage risks and opportu-
nities in the political and administrative landscape and understand the societal 
demands and work through or in close contact with reform-minded top public offi -
cials. Another major challenge is to avoid a situation where accountability interven-
tions substitute civil society initiatives to failing state capacity, which can lead to 
even more disorganisation of the service delivery framework. The support provided 
by external support agencies often tends to focus on participatory approaches. 
However, evidence confi rms that without the threat of effective sanctions (and 
resulting impacts), citizen mobilisation is diffi cult to sustain in the long run. 
Similarly, as noted by the general literature on anticorruption, anticorruption 
reforms should not only target law enforcement, but rather public offi cials should be 
part of broader changes on how they interact with the public (Rose-Ackerman and 
Carrington  2013 ). 
 For external support agencies to tackle these risks and to achieve sustainable 
results, there is a need to broaden the scope of efforts. One fi rst useful step is to 
ensure that support to accountability targets both social accountability mechanisms, 
aimed at increasing citizens’ voice, and traditional accountability mechanisms, such 
as investigations, inspections and audits which can impose formal sanctions. Civil 
society organisations play a key role in demanding accountability, but weaknesses 
of the NGO sector in many aid-dependent countries can constrain the effectiveness 
of external support agency interventions. Many NGOs rely on external assistance 
while at the same time they need to develop credibility, local legitimacy and inde-
pendence from the government. Donors will need to provide long-term support in a 
balanced way, without undermining the necessary commitment to local improve-
ment while aiming at developing self-sustainable organisations. 
 An associated challenge to these processes is the long-term need to see reforms 
make changes on the ground, for users but also for politicians who want re-election 
and for external support agents who need to show short-term results to their con-
stituencies. The next generation of accountability support will require a more politi-
cally informed understanding of the national context, more fl exibility and patience 
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from external support agencies, a capacity to work with the existing local fabric 
without making it overdependent on external actors and developing a long-term and 
open vision from national governments to increase the role of citizens in the public 
space. 
10.9  Conclusions 
 Limited integrity manifested in corruption is a concern for the whole water sector 
which disproportionately affects the development of the most vulnerable countries. 
The implementation of water policies and the sustainable use and development of 
water are at high risk. 
 Experience suggests that functioning accountability systems are one important 
element to improve water integrity. To increase its impacts, there is a need to use 
accountability measures in more integrative ways, such as developing mutually 
supportive measures to strengthen social accountability and horizontal accountabil-
ity between government agencies. Hence, if there are real risks of not only getting 
exposed but that exposure can also lead to legal actions, the likelihood of account-
ability measures gaining impacts is enhanced. This is clearly coupled with the need 
for a sector governance focus more strongly coupled with other national governance 
efforts to strengthen anticorruption commissions, procurement oversight agencies 
and judiciary systems. 
 Most research and development cooperation programming on water integrity 
and corruption thus far has focused on household water supply and irrigation. 
While, in general, there is an urgent need to intensify work in these areas, there is a 
sense of urgency to develop water integrity and anticorruption research and pro-
gramming across water users and institutional fragmentations. For example, the 
much required water infrastructure investments in many developing countries are at 
high risk of corruption, which can affect their effi ciency as well as potential inves-
tors backing out due to too high business risks. 
 Some are now starting to acknowledge  the elephant in the room . The challenges 
raised by limited integrity and corruption in water management have long been 
recognised as important. What is new, however, is the increased awareness of the 
issue at the international and national levels. This recognition has sparked debates 
on how to tackle the problems and challenges associated with it. While integrity is 
still a highly sensitive social and political topic in many contexts and for develop-
ment partners in particular, the use of water integrity and associated measures to 
promote transparency, accountability and participation can offer a constructive way 
forward to get around some of these sensitivities. 
 Improving integrity and reducing corruption is a means to an end. The objective 
of particular reforms and the characteristics of the political and socio-economic 
contexts in which they are implemented should guide the choice of the types of sup-
port measures put in place. It is critical to trace and assess the link between anticor-
ruption measures and their outcomes. This is a very challenging task since this type 
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of information is diffi cult to come by and information on costs and benefi ts of alter-
native options is frequently not available. 
 An urgent call is made for developing a strong research agenda on water integrity 
and anticorruption. In countries with malfunctioning governance systems, lack of 
integrity and high frequency of corrupt interactions is one of the single biggest gov-
ernance issues to be resolved. Very modest resources have so far been devoted in the 
water sector to explore corruption hotspots, impacts and consequences and the type 
of measures that should be applied. To date, we know fairly little about the measures 
that work and in what contexts. Importantly, such research agendas should also 
move beyond the narrow focus on institutions to include the role of social pressures 
in minimising corruption. 
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